TY - JOUR
AU - Makaś, Michał
PY - 2016/08/30
Y2 - 2021/10/26
TI - A Certain Version of Preservationism
JF - Logic and Logical Philosophy
JA - LLP
VL - 26
IS - 1
SE - Articles
DO - 10.12775/LLP.2016.027
UR - https://apcz.umk.pl/LLP/article/view/LLP.2016.027
SP - 63-77
AB - <p>A certain approach to paraconsistency was initiated by works of R. Jennings and P. Schotch. In their “Inference and necessity” [4] they proposed a notion of a level of inconsistency (incoherence) of a given set of premises. This level is a measure that assigns to a given set of premises X, the least number of elements of covers of X that consist of consistent subsets of X. The idea of the level of inconsistency allows to formulate a paraconsistent inference relation called by the authors forcing, while the obtained approach preservationism. Similarly as classical inference relation is truth-preserving, the obtained inference relation is preserving the level of inconsistency.</p><p>We will discuss some examples of inferences that are valid in the sense of Jennings-Schotch inference relation and rise some questions on them. Based on that we formulate an inference relation as an answer to the mentioned doubts.</p><p>As regards forcing inference relation, the set of premises needed to derive a given conclusion can vary when changing covers from one to another. Our proposal is to stipulate to have some common set of relevant premises.</p>
ER -